TEL AVIV, Israel — An investigation by the Israeli army has decided that Hamas was capable of perform the deadliest assault in Israeli historical past on Oct. 7, 2023, as a result of the far more highly effective Israeli military misjudged the militant group’s intentions and underestimated its capabilities.
The findings, launched Thursday, might stress Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a broadly demanded broader inquiry to look at the political decision-making that preceded the assault, which triggered the conflict in Gaza.
Many Israelis imagine the errors of Oct. 7 lengthen past the army, they usually blame Netanyahu for what they view as a failed technique of deterrence and containment within the years main as much as the assault. That technique included permitting Qatar to ship suitcases of money into Gaza and sidelining Hamas’ rival, the internationally acknowledged Palestinian Authority.
The prime minister has not taken accountability, saying he’ll reply powerful questions solely after the conflict, which has been paused for practically six weeks by a tenuous ceasefire. Regardless of public stress, together with from the households of the roughly 1,200 folks killed within the Oct. 7 assault and the 251 taken as hostages into Gaza, Netanyahu has resisted requires a fee of inquiry.
The army’s principal findings have been that the area’s strongest and complex army misinterpret Hamas’ intentions, underestimated its capabilities and was wholly unprepared for the shock assault by hundreds of closely armed militants within the early morning hours of a significant Jewish vacation.
The army’s findings are consistent with previous conclusions reached by officers and analysts. The army launched solely a abstract of the report and army officers outlined its findings.
“Oct. 7 was a complete failure,” stated one army official, who spoke on situation of anonymity consistent with rules.
A central false impression was that Hamas, which seized management of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in 2007, was extra concerned with governing the territory than preventing Israel, the inquiry discovered.
The army additionally misjudged the militant group’s capabilities. Navy planners had envisioned that, at worst, Hamas might stage a floor invasion from as much as eight border factors, the official stated. The truth is, Hamas had greater than 60 assault routes.
Intelligence assessed within the aftermath of the assault has proven Hamas got here near staging the offensive on three earlier events however delayed it for unknown causes, the official stated.
The official stated that within the hours earlier than the assault, there have been indicators that one thing was amiss, together with when Hamas fighters switched their telephones over to the Israeli community.
The notion that Hamas didn’t need conflict guided choice makers away from taking motion which may have thwarted the assault. The Israeli army official stated intelligence exhibits that Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the Oct. 7 assault who was killed final October, had begun planning it as early as 2017.
With the army off guard on a vacation weekend, Hamas launched a heavy wave of rockets that allowed hundreds of fighters to burst by the safety fence or fly over it on dangle gliders. They knocked out surveillance cameras and rapidly overwhelmed tons of of troopers stationed alongside the border.
From there they superior to key freeway intersections and attacked troops dispatched to the world, together with some senior officers, disrupting the army’s command and management, in accordance with a second army official, who additionally spoke on situation of anonymity.
For the primary three hours after the assault, Hamas fighters marauded by border communities and a music pageant with little resistance. That was when a lot of the 251 hostages have been taken and most of the people have been killed, the official stated. The official stated the chaos led to pleasant hearth incidents, though he stated there weren’t many, with out disclosing a determine.
It took hours for the army to regain management and days till the world was totally cleared of militants.
In keeping with the primary official, the report blamed the army for being overconfident in its data and never exhibiting sufficient doubt in its core ideas and beliefs. It didn’t place blame on any particular person troopers or officers, however is more likely to pave the best way for a reckoning within the army and eventual dismissals.
Some high-ranking officers have already resigned, together with the previous head of army intelligence and Israel’s prime common, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, who steps down subsequent week.